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Welcome and introduction to the 
6th Munich Economic Summit 2007 by
HANS-WERNER SINN
President of the Ifo Institute and CESifo
Ladies and Gentlemen,
I would like to briefly introduce the topic by alluding
to the demographic crisis and one of the session top-
ics, “The Road to Gerontocracy”, then speak about
social security and the policy implications.
Firstly, some remarks on the demographic crisis.
Europeans are old, though not the oldest. Expressed
in terms of median age, the Japanese are 43 years
old.The EU-15 has a median age of 40.The new EU
members are a little younger, at an average age of
38 compared to the Americans at 36, the Chinese at
33 and the Indians at 24. Europeans are not only
among the oldest, we are also getting older faster
than the others.Figure 1 shows the median age of the
EU population over one century from 1950 to 2050,
as partly predicted by the United Nations. If one
compares the EU-15 with the US, at each point of
time the European age is higher.At present, the age
is about 40 in Europe which is already 4 years older
than that of Americans. The age of Americans will
increase, of course, but even in 30 years time they
will have a younger population than Europe has
now. Furthermore, Europeans will be eight years
older than Americans by the mid-2030s. Even
though the new EU member countries are now
younger, it is anticipated that they will get older
more rapidly than the EU-15 countries.
Consequently they will have exactly the same medi-
an age by the mid-2030s as the western European
countries.
Why are we so old? And why are we ageing fast? The
truth behind the change in the demographic struc-
ture is, as we all know, that too few babies are being
born.How many is too few? The OECD comparison
of fertility rates is shown in Figure 2. Here the two-
coloured columns show the difference between the
US and the EU-27.The US is close to 2.08, which is
acknowledged to be the number that would keep the
population constant, and Europe is considerably
below it. None of the European countries, even
France which had a fertility rate of 1.92 in 2005, has
a comparable number to that of the US.The French
fertility rate has improved and was announced to be
2.0 at the beginning of this year. But even this is
below the American number.
There are other statistics that I find equally inter-
esting.For example,the number of children relative
to the population,i.e.the number of births per 1,000
inhabitants (see Figure 3). In
the US there are 14 births per
1,000 people, and in the EU-27
there are 10.4. France is close to
the US, and Ireland has even
more babies than the Ame-
ricans. At its present ranking,
Germany is the lowest in the
entire developed world.There is
no country with fewer babies
per 1,000 inhabitants than this
country has. The fertility dia-
gram on the left shows Ger-
many in the lower part but in
the comparison of the number
of babies per thousand inhabi-
tants the country ranks at the
bottom.
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Figure 1What could be the reason? Well,it has to do with the
timing of fertility rates. In the early 1960s the EU-25
had a fertility rate of about 2.5, but that has now
declined to 1.5.In all countries,including France and
the Netherlands, the fertility rate declined in the
1960s and 1970s. Spain, Italy, Germany and Poland
have undergone a more remarkable decline.
Germany was the first country to experience a drop
in the fertility rate. In Italy, for example, the decline
started six years later. In Spain it came five years
after Italy, and in Poland ten years after Italy.These
timing differences in the decline
of the fertility rate explain the
differences in the number of
babies per thousand inhabitants.
All in all, the relatively small
number of women of child-bear-
ing age and the relatively low
number of children per woman
made Germany the country with
the lowest number of births per
thousand inhabitants in the
entire world.
Ageing will change the political
situation in Germany because
the elderly will become the
majority group of voters. This
will have strong implications for
political parties and their pro-
grams, and eventually for the
welfare state. Obviously, one
aspect of this is the pension sys-
tem. Old people, or even those
who still work, would favour an expansion of the
pension system. Young people, i.e. those who would
have to pay for it, are hesitant and will be against it.
Where is the border line? At what age are you like-
ly to be for the expansion of the pension system and
when would you as a loser be against it? This aspect
is shown for three countries (France, Italy and Ger-
many) based on the so-called indifference age
(Figure 4).
People are in favor of expanding the pension system
when they are above the critical
age. On the other hand, people
are in favor of curtailing the pen-
sion system when their age is
below the critical age. It is inter-
esting to see what happens when
one compares the indifference
age with the median age curves
mentioned above. This median
age curve cuts the green indiffer-
ence age curve in the first half of
the next decade in these three
observed countries, meaning that
there will be a strict majority of
the old voting population who
support the expansion of the pen-
sion system.There is,in this sense,
a well-defined road to gerontoc-
racy. Social security will be under
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strain, as we all know, the pay-as-you-go pension sys-
tems will be in trouble, and the difficulties will result
from the changing ratio of those who are retired to
those of working age. This is shown by the old-age
dependency ratio in Figure 5, which depicts a curve
covering the hundred years from 1950 to 2050.Today
the dependency ratio has already doubled since 1950.
And it will almost double again from now until 2050.
So there will be a quadrupling of the dependency ratio
over one hundred years. This fact implies that, com-
pared with the case in 1950, nearly four times as many
old people will have to be financed by a person of
working age. In the U.S. this picture is less alarming,
but the development is, in principle, similar.The situa-
tion appears to be worse in Japan, where the ratio has
been increasing even faster than anywhere else. All
European countries face similar increases in the old
age dependency ratio, with Italy being in a similar sit-
uation to that of Japan (Figure 6). Roughly speaking,
these countries will experience a doubling in the num-
ber of elderly relative to the young within the next
thirty years.Consequently,the implication for the pay-
as-you-go system is straightforward. Either we double
the contribution rate if we want to keep the pensions
in line with wages,or we halve the pensions relative to
wages.Or we might choose a mixture of these policies.
But whatever linear combination we choose, it will be
equally problematic. Resources will dwindle as the
number of young people dwindles, and the conflict
about the distribution between the young and old is
pre-programmed.
What are the policy implications required to over-
come these problems? Well, if a country does not
have enough own people, the country can import
people from elsewhere: immigration. Obviously,
this is a solution if the immigrants are young. How
many would a country need? The numbers are
alarming. If we assume that immigrants were to
stay young forever and never retire, the old EU
would need an additional 194 million people up to
2035 in order to keep the dependency ratio con-
stant. Hence, this number of people is required in
order to keep the contribution rate and the relative
pension level constant. But, of course, this is only
an artificial calculation because immigrants also
age.How many people would have to immigrate to
Western Europe to keep the dependency ratio or
the pension system unchanged if you take into
account that immigrants will also retire. The
United Nations made this calculation in its study
on replacement migration suggesting a number of
701 million. Of course, that is not a recommenda-
tion; it is just a forecast. Western Europe has
presently 390 million people. Another 701 million
people would be needed to really solve the prob-
lem so that the contribution rates,tax rates and the
pension levels relative to the then prevailing wages
would remain constant in this part of the world.
These numbers are so astronomical,making it clear
that immigration is nothing more than a drop in
the ocean in this context.
Working longer is, of course, another option. In
Germany, the Social Democratic Party was in an
uproar because the party leader Mr Münterfering
proposed extending the retirement age to 67 years.
How long would we have to work to keep the con-
tribution and the replacement rates constant?
According to the UN study it would be 77 years!
The so-called partial funding is another possibility.
Partial funding is based on the following philosophy:
In order to financially manage in old age, people
either have to raise children so that their children
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Figure 4can finance them, or they have to save and live off
their savings. There is no third possibility unless
resources were to come from abroad. If that is
excluded,there are only two alternatives.Europeans
have decided not to have as many children as their
ancestors had. They do not invest in human capital
formation either,as economists would say,as the ear-
lier generations did. So the logical consequence is
that the amount they did not invest in human capital
has to be invested in real capital to fill the gap.This
is the philosophy behind the German Riester
reform, as it was formulated by the Council of
Economic Advisors to the Ministry of Economics
some ten years ago.
Another possibility is to have
more support for families – fam-
ily policies. What can we do in
this context? Needed are educa-
tional policies that help women
overcome the conflict between
having children and working.
For instance, Germany could
imitate the French system by
introducing an école maternelle
allowing all young kids as of age
three to go to school, so women
would be free to work.We could
have all-day schools in Germany.
Most countries in Europe have
them, but not Germany. And
Germany could have more gen-
erous family allowances, similar
to the quotient famiale (child-
splitting) in France.
In addition, instead of giving
resources to families, we should
stop exploiting them. A family
that raises a child provides a pre-
cious asset to society. The child
pays taxes and contributions to
the fiscal system, and there is a
huge fiscal externality for the
benefit of the society if a child is
born. Regarding this aspect,
Martin Werding of the Ifo
Institute has done some calcula-
tions for the Bosch Foundation.
And he came up with the num-
ber of nearly 140,000 euros,
which is the net present value of
the fiscal advantage for the pen-
sion system if a child is born. Of
course, the child gets old and
benefits from the system, but it also produces off-
spring that cover these costs.The child pays into the
system and the net effect of this stream of payments
from zero, when the child was born, until infinity,
taking all the offspring of that child into considera-
tion, is 140,000 euros. It is as if the government
placed a debt certificate, an IOU, into the cradle
worth 140,000 euros, giving the mother and child the
option of drawing on this debt later but with interest.
We do not have to help the families. I think we just
have to stop discriminating against them.
The pension system in Germany provides some
relief for mothers who raise an additional child and
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work ten years after the birth.They receive, in terms
of current value, 11,000 euros as an additional pen-
sion. This is close to nothing. What we should do in
my opinion is reduce the degree of socialisation of
the fruits of human capital investment, which would
possibly lead to an increase in human capital invest-
ment. We know that if we socialize the fruits of
investment there will be less investment.Why do we
believe that this does not apply to child-raising rela-
tive to other types of investment? If parents knew
that whatever they invested in their children would
help them in old age,they would have more children.
It used to be like that before Bismarck started social-
ising young people’s earning capacities in the pen-
sion system. Prior to Bismarck’s reform, all people
knew that they ought to have children to have a
decent life in old age. But after Bismark everything
changed. People learned that it was possible to lead
a decent life in old age,even without having children
of their own.An alternative way of living, which was
simply impossible before Bismark, became possible
and was copied by more and more people over time.
As a result, people’s attitudes changed. Child-based
pension systems would be the solution. In Germany
in 1957, when reforms were being implemented, this
discussion came up, but the then Chancellor
Adenauer listened to the argument that people
would have children anyway, which, as it turns out,
was wrong.
These are just some of my introductory thoughts on
the subject.
I look forward to a stimulating conference.
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